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Human-like behavior and cognition: Not a good starting point
Commentary on Chapman & Huffman on Human Difference

Magnus Helgheim Blystad
Department of Behavioral Science, Oslo Metropolitan University
Abstract: Chapman & Huffman make use of observations and studies that show how humans may
not be as unique in our behaviour and cognition as previously thought. I wholeheartedly agree
that our uniqueness might be small and that if it exists, it should not give our species any right to
act cruelly towards other animals. However, this kind of logic can be problematic. I present a few
of the issues in this commentary.
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Humans are different from other animals, but we are still animals. Uniquely human traits and
skills shrink in numbers as we discover variants of them in the field and in the lab, as Chapman &
Huffman (2018) describe. For cognitive abilities, it is perhaps harder to draw a line between
human and non-human animals, for many reasons.
It is true that a cognitive appraisal of animals shows us that much of what we can do is
within their capabilities. To Chapman & Huffman’s examples I would add discoveries from the
field of rodent laboratory research. Rodent research has shown that these small mammals are
capable of cooperation (Schneeberger, Dietz, & Taborsky, 2012), helping behaviour (Bartal,
Decety, & Mason, 2011), and sharing of rewards (Hernandez-Lallement, van Wingerden, Marx,
Srejic, & Kalenscher, 2014). Why animals perform human-like behaviour is hard to grasp.
One problem is that animals do not self-report; so unless we can add data regarding
mechanisms in their nervous system with a human analogue, it is hard to know exactly why an
animal does one thing and not another, especially in advanced behaviour or cognitive tasks.
Moreover, even where there are human analogues, interpretation problems may remain because
the level of granularity needed for the observed behaviour needs to be very high in order to get
a correct neural correlate (Krakauer, Ghazanfar, Gomez-Marin, MacIver, & Poeppel, 2017).
Another counterpoint to using the seemingly convincing evidence of human-like
behaviour in animals is, of course, interpretations and evidence against these discoveries. For
example, in studies of rodent pro-sociality, some researchers claim to observe empathy (i.e.,
Bartal et al., 2011) but others disagree, both theoretically (Vasconcelos, Hollis, Nowbahari, &
Kacelnik, 2012) and experimentally (Silberberg et al., 2013). Contested claims make for poor
arguments.
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The argument of similarities in species on account of similar behaviour falls apart when
examples of more bestial behaviours in animals emerge, and the subsequent response by
conspecifics. While cooperation in dolphins to save injured conspecifics is well known and
documented (Siebenaler & Caldwell, 1956), so are acts of sexual aggression (Sargeant, WatsonCapps, Scott, Connor, & Mann, 2005). Of course, the horrific behaviour above is exhibited by
humans as well, but humans performing similar horrible acts must answer for their crimes. Human
society frowns upon and tries to remove these elements from their midst. An alpha lion killing
existing cubs in his pride is not ostracised or denied mates.
I do not think that relying on surface valid behaviour is a logically sound approach. More
important: it can easily lead us down a path where value is given to animals if they perform tasks
humans think are interesting. That is not where we want to be.
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